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And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die: For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof,
then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil. Genesis 3:6
Fraud is as old as the world. And so we find in
our Biblical writings of the misrepresentation in
the Garden of Eden, and the later deception of
Isaac by Jacob with the connivance of his mother
Rebekah in obtaining his father's blessing and the
birthright of his brother Esau. The builder of the
treasury of Rameses III is said by Herodotus to
have provided a secret passage by which he might
drain the treasure of his royal master. The Jews
in bondage in Egypt devised means to defraud
their captors of their jewels. Loaded dice have been
found in ancient Herculaneum. Individuals prac-
tised fraud as a profession in ancient and medieval
times. Throughout the ages men of glib tongue and
lacking in moral sense have practised deception
upon their fellows for their own personal advantage
and gain, or being of otherwise good morals en-
gaged in deceit to perpetrate a mischief or thinking
to extricate themselves from financial stress.
All through history we find the evil of fraud and
man trying to protect himself against the swindler,
the liar, and the cheat with negligible success. In
ancient times frauds were the concern of the indi-
vidual, to be settled as best they could, sometimes
by counter-fraud or even force of arms. Frauds
therefore generally were considered personal or
civil wrongs. However, it is interesting to note
that forgery, which is actually a particular type of
fraud, was considered a crime against the king and
the state as this offence might affect anyone in the
realm, and consequently, it carried the death
penalty.
With the passage of time the law has come to
make greater provision for frauds both as to crim-
inal and civil recourse. Provisions for the crime
now appear on the statute books with a more
adequate and equitable basis of punishment.
DEFINITION
The word fraud is derived from the Latinfraus,
meaning deceit. It is a common law term for which
there is no comprehensive definition. The New
Century Dictionary (1953) provides the most en-
lightening description as "deceit or trickery delib-
erately practised in order to gain some advantage
or end unfairly, dishonestly, or to the prejudice of
another's right or interest (as, to obtain a prize or
carry an election by fraud; to allege fraud in a
bankruptcy case or in the administration of an
estate ... frauds in business operations; ... a
deception, artifice, or trick;.., anything contrived
or intended to deceive)". Black's Law Dictionary
states that fraud in general consists of some deceit-
ful practice or wilful device resorted to with intent
to deprive another of his right, or in some manner
to do him an injury. Buckley, J. in Re: London and
Globe Finance Corporation 1903, 1. ch 723 (as
approved by Darling, J. Court of Criminal Appeal
-Rex v Bennett 23, C.C.C. 609) states: "To de-
ceive is, I apprehend, to induce a man to believe
that thing is true which is false, and which the
person practising the deceit knows to be false. To
defraud is to deprive by deceit; it is by deceit to
induce a man to act to his injury."
The essence of the matter is deceit-some
statement or suppression of fact in word or deed
with intent to deceive. Fraud is a general term
applicable to many crimes and to matters which
are not criminal at all, ranging from good natured
boasting by the individual to gain personal esteem
or others' respect, through the field of practical
joking and mischief, the literary, artistic, anthro-
pological, and archeological forgeries, the mas-
querade in order to travel incognito, to cover up
past deficiencies or to attain denied aspirations,
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through the "con" man, the high pressure real
estate promoter, the "long distance telephone stock
broker", the gold mine swindler, to the outright
embezzler. All figure in the intriguing story of the
ingenuity and ingenuousness of mankind.
The lower scale, so called harmless frauds,
are not actionable unless unforeseen injury ac-
crues. In the higher scale some frauds are criminal
and others civil, but a conspiracy to defraud is
always criminal. Our interest as policemen lies in
the field of fraud as a crime, however, as a basis of
comparison and appreciation it is well to consider
something of the basis of "civil" frauds-particu-
larly as the delineation is sometimes as deceptive
as the definition of fraud itself.
Civm FRAUD
The civil law requires that certain special ele-
ments be proved before the defrauded person can
recover damages and in which very stringent rem-
edies can be imposed. In the circumstances of an
alleged fraudulent sale, which is a common ex-
ample of civil fraud, the buyer must show:
a. that there was a false representation or state-
ment in regard to the commodity or property;
b. that the vendor knew it was false or lacked
sufficient basis for making the statement;
c. that in making the statement the defendant
vendor intended to induce the plaintiff pur-
chaser to act or refrain from acting, in reliance
on the misrepresentation;
d. that there was a reasonable reliance by the
purchaser on the statement;
e. that damages resulted to the purchaser as a
result of the reliance.
So to sustain fraud there must be a material mis-
representation which induced the contract, inten-
tional or made with reckless disregard of the truth,
as a result of which loss was suffered.
Let us briefly consider some of the basic prin-
ciples of the civil law that form the foundation of
the action for fraud. As a rule, the contract is not
invalidated when a person makes a bad bargain
by his own poor judgment, ignorance of the law, or
a mistake in interpretation of the conditions of an
agreement. However, on the other hand a contract
is not enforceable where the mistake has been
brought about by either a mutual mistake between
the parties as to the essential facts of the contract
or by fraud or negligence of the other party. In
general the rule caveat emplor (let the buyer beware)
applies to contracts, which implies that the seller
is not obliged to reveal facts to the buyer which if
disclosed would be to the seller's disadvantage.
It is appreciated that this rule of law provides
leeway for abuse particularly in the fields of com-
modity advertising, the financing prospectus, and
securities promotion, which prompted the noted
criminologist Edwin H. Sutherland to comment:
"These cases of misrepresentotion and fraud have
not been subject to prosecution in most cases, for
the courts have operated on the principle caveat
enplor, which has meant that the purchaser must
protect himself against ordinary dishonesty and
could appeal to the courts for protection only
against extraordinary dishonesty. President Roose-
velt in 1933 insisted that the principle be reversed
and caveat vendor be substituted, especially with
regard to securities."'
It should be observed here that this principle
caveat vendor forms some considerable basis of our
provincial statutes and commissions pertaining to
securities and also to- the federal Pure Food and
Drug Act. All such legislation and organizations
are designed idealistically at least to control what
was a fertile field for the unscrupulous vendor and
to protect the innocent purchaser or consumer.
There is an exception to the rule of caveat emptor.
When a party, lacking knowledge of the subject
matter of the contract, enters into an agreement
under a mistake as to what the other party's inten-
tions are and the other party is aware of such
mistake, the contract is void. However, if a party
is simply mistaken as to the intention and the
other party has done nothing to convey such false
impression, the contract will not be affected. A
contract which enables one party to profit know-
ingly from another's clerical mistake, which is
embodied in the contract, will not be enforceable.
MISREPRESENTATION COMPARED VITH FRAUD
In the matter of legal remedies one must con-
sider the difference between innocent misrepre-
sentation and false representation or fraud. Inno-
cent misrepresentation is "a misstatement of
material facts either not known to be untrue or
made without intention to deceive. The misrepre-
sentation must relate to material facts-facts
which have induced or brought about the contract
-and not just passing statements which would not
ordinarily influence decision such as extravagant
"sales talk" or "salesman's puffing" of which the
1EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, PRINcIPLEs OF CRIAm-
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public is aware, comes to expect, and consequently
discounts. The essential difference between innocent
misrepresentation and fraud therefore is the
intention with which the false statement is made.
Consequently, immaterial misrepresentation is not
sufficient grounds on which to repudiate the con-
tract; innocent material misrepresentation when
proved is grounds for repudiation of contract; and
finally fraud is a basis of repudiation of contract
and also a claim for damages. Both actions for
repudiation and for claim for damages must be
undertaken without undue delay on discovery of
the misrepresentation. Further, in event of a resale
of fraudulently obtained property a person cannot
recover his property against some innocent pur-
chaser who has bought it without notice of fraud.
STATUTE or FRAUDS
A consideration of the law relating to fraud
would be incomplete without mention of the
Statute of Frauds. This was an important English
law passed in 1673 (29 Charles II ch.3) which with
modifications has exerted a notable influence on
the laws of the English speaking world. Its inten-
tion was to require written evidence for verbal in
many classes of transactions with the object of pre-
vention of fraud and perjury. Its effect is to make
writing essential to the validity of many contracts
or transactions. Consequently, conveyances, wills,
and -leases were required to be in writing and
signed, and no action could be brought on certain
agreements unless the plaintiff could prove the
agreement by writing duly signed.
Therefore, in particular the Statute of Frauds
required the following to be in writing: (1) Admin-
istration of estates; (2) Promise in answer to a
debt, default, or miscarriage of another person;
(3) Agreement in consideration of marriage; (4)
Contracts on sale of lands, tenements, or interest
thereof; (5) Any agreement that is not to be per-
formed within one year; and (6) Sales of goods
over a certain value (X10), otherwise the buyer to
receive some of the goods sold or something be
given in earnest to bind the bargain or in part
payment.
CRIMINAL FRAUD AND FALSE PRETENCES
At the outset in considering the criminal aspect
of fraudulent acts we must differentiate between
the words "fraud" and "false pretences". "Fraud"
is a general term and lends itself to many varied
and independent offences in which the individual
or the public injured have been misled deliberately
and with intent that they should be so deceived,
e.g., fraud in the celebration of feigned marriage;
fraud in obtaining consent of indecent assault of a
female; frauds upon the government; false entries
in books to defraud creditors; frauds by company
directors; fraud by a public officer.
"False pretences" is used in a statutory enact-
ment of a penal nature and therefore has to do
with a certain type of crime and no other. False
pretences is properly applicable to obtaining some-
thing tangible or capable of being stolen. Obviously
false pretences can be defined more exactly than
fraud. It is also noted that false pretences has a
relationship to the crime of theft.
As a further differentiation it might be said that
"fraud" is a statement which the person has no
intention of fulfilling. On the other hand "false
pretences" is a representation of existing fact, past
or present, which is untrue.
It should be stressed that the purpose of crim-
inal proceedings is to punish a wrongdoer for a
crime against the state not just against the indi-
vidual victim; while the object of civil action is to
obtain compensation for the individual who has
been wronged. Hence criminal proceedings for
fraudulent acts are not for the purpose of securing
restitution nor can the individual victim properly
condone or pardon such an offence.
FALSE PRETENCES
There are four ingredients to an offence of false
pretences, without which a charge cannot succeed:
Representation, Property, Intent, and Reliance.
These should be considered with related and basic
legal principles.
Representation. A representation must have been
made by the accused to the complainant, which
representation (verbal, by acts, or otherwise-such
as by circumstances, created by the accused, his
conduct and natural and reasonable inference con-
veyed) was untrue and known to be untrue by the
accused when he made the representation. This
representation must refer to an untrue existing
fact, i.e. past or present and not something to
transpire in the future.
A check provides a general example. The pres-
entation of a currently dated check implies that
the person has and presumably knows he has an
existing account in the bank in question and funds
to meet the demand, unless inadvertently and
without fraudulent intention overdrawn. On the
other hand a post dated check, unless dated to
mislead or presented with other implications of an
[Vol. 49
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existing account, does not stand the test of "a rep-
resentation of facts, past or present". It is merely
a promise to pay in the future, thus assuming the
nature of a promissory note as opposed to a readily
negotiable instrument, and a matter for civil action
rather than criminal prosecution for false pretences.
False pretences cannot normally succeed on a
representation of something to be done in the fu-
ture even though the promise was made fraudu-
lently.
It should be noted here that persuading a person
to make a promissory note by means of a false
pretence is not an offence under Section 304 (1) (a)
Criminal Code of Canada as "credit" is not some-
thing of which the offence of theft may be com-
mitted, such as is the case of obtaining goods by
means of a worthless check. Obtaining credit by
false pretences is provided for in Section 304 (1)
(b), and it must be shown that trust not money
was so obtained.
Properly. It is essential that something "in
respect of which the offence of theft may be com-
mitted" (capable of being stolen) be obtained by
the accused from the complainant or delivered to
another person either directly from the misrepre-
sentation or indirectly as a result. The relationship
with theft is again evident, but a clear distinction
should be drawn between "false pretences" and
"theft by trick" even though both are based on
fraudulent circumstances. The test is whether the
complainant parted with both physical possession
and title or ownership (false pretences) or pos-
session only (theft).
There are three separate offences under Section
304 (1)(a) C.C.: (1) Obtaining property directly
by false pretences; (2) Obtaining property in-
directly through the medium of a contract ob-
tained by a false pretence; and (3) Obtaining by
false pretences the delivery of property to another
person.
Intent. There must be intention to defraud,
which can be drawn by inference from the repre-
sentation made and the property received as es-
tablished in evidence. Buckley, J. in Re: London
and Globe and Finance Corporation states ".... to
deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind;
to defraud is by deceit to induce a course of ac-
tion."
Reliaice. The complainant must have rdlied
upon the untrue representation as genuine, and
the misrepresentation must have been material in
that it provided the inducement upon which the
property passed. A charge of false pretences will
not stand if the victim was not misled by or as a
result of faith in the material misrepresentation
of the accused and acted finally on his own judg-
ment. However, a charge of attempted false pre-
tence may succeed, as attempt is complete when
the false pretence has been made with intention
to defraud. Reliance is the link between the false
representation and the ultimate passing of prop-
erty which is essential to the charge of obtaining
by false pretences. Further, the false pretence
continues to the time of obtaining as long as there
is a direct connection between the initial pretence
and the ultimate obtaining.
ExTErN or FRADD
Money is the life-blood -of business, and at the
same time is said to be the root of all evil. It is
natural that frauds largely devolve around busi-
ness, in fact or fancy. In fancy the bigger swindles
present the imposing business front all 'the 'better
to beguile while behind the facade exists an empty
shell of business organization. It is not the purpose
of this essay to explore the more fanciful manifes-
tations of business fraud but to confine ourselves
to the factual or fraud in genuine business opera-
tions.
There are two broad classes of fraud to be found
in business: those committed usually by employees
in order to conceal actual theft, and those perpe-
trated usually by management. The latter frauds
do not normally involve theft, at least not directly,
and take the form of manipulations to present a
false financial condition by overstatement or
understatement depending on the purpose: to the
detriment of investors, for creation of secret re-
serves, the defrauding of taxation, credit frauds
as disclosed by bankruptcies, stock frauds as ex-
posed by security enquiries. What has been called
"White Collar Crime" falls into this class. This
type of "crime" involves corruption, manipuiation
of contracts, graft, patronage, and the like as
manifested in the "mink coat and deep freeze" era
in the U.S.A. Combines, price-fixing, restraint of
trade, "loan sharks" operations, and fraudulent
advertising could also be included in this category
of "crime". The type of crime is borderline and
usually involves those with position to take ad-
vantage and the power to evade.
In this paper we shall confine our interest to
fraud committed by employees in order to conceal
theft, called embezzlement, and taking the form
of defalcation and forgery. Losses from embezzle-
ment in the U.S.A. and Canada attain the stagger-
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Table 1
Number of Convictions in Canada
1951 1952 1953 1954
Embezzlement ......... 131 141 140 181
False Pretences ........ 3747 4175 4570 4903
Fraud & Corruption ... 147 58 139 184
Forgery & Uttering .... 1950 2224 2128 2905
Perjury ............... 49 45 35 53
Blackmail & Extortion. 25 11 30 25
ing figure of over $500,000,000 for a year, and yet
embezzlement losses are less than half that in-
volved in credit and stock frauds. Embezzlement
however is of more direct police interest. It at-
tracts greater attention because of its spectacular
nature and the human factor-in that it concerns
an individual in whom trust has reposed-and
this crime is more readily exposed, traced, appre-
hended, and prosecuted.
The table 1 of statistics as to the incidence and
trend of embezzlement and other crime involving
fraud elements provides figures of some signifi-
cance.
Available statistics reflect Ontario as having
approximately 3Y2 times the recorded defalcations
of Quebec, 23Y2 more than B.C. and Alberta, 31
times Saskatchewan, and 47 times that of Mani-
toba and Nova Scotia.
Needless to say fraud is of such a nature that
the full extent is never known. Considerable fraud
goes undetected, and not all that is discovered is
made public. Other vital considerations, apart
from the colossal monetary loss, are the threat to
the health and existence of business organization
involved in the constant nefarious drain of the
monetary life-blood and the loss of human re-
sources represented in both culprits and victims.
CAUSES OF EMBEZZLEMENT
Considerable research has been done on the
makeup of the embezzler and much has been
written on the subject. By and large there is
nothing about the portrait of the average embez-
zler to set him or her apart from the average man
or woman. In a great many cases, it is sad to say
but for a moment of weakness or the stress of
financial worry, the embezzler might have con-
tinued as a normal, useful citizen.
Generally speaking fraud is a bilateral crime,
there is both the subjective and objective forces
at play. Both the culprit and the victim contribute
their part to the fraud, the defrauder in his cun-
ning preys upon the cupidity of the defrauded in
their mutual human desire for easy gain. There
are two elements also at work in the crime of em-
bezzlement, one being "management's sin" and
the other the embezzler's offence. Management is
responsible for placing temptation in the way of
his employee, providing the opportunity to de-
fraud through inadequate accounting procedures
and lack of proper internal control systems. This
element joined with the sudden overwhelming
need or desire for more money provides the com-
bination for embezzlement.
As for the embezzler, statistics establish the fol-
lowing general factors as the main causes of em-
bezzlement in the order of relative importance:
(1) Gambling
(2) Extravagant living standards
(3) Unusual family expenses
(4) Undesirable associates
(5) Inadequate income
(6) Resentment or revenge.
METHODS OF EMBEZZLING
Embezzling takes many devious forms depend-
ing on the ingenuity of the individual and the sys-
tems with which he must cope in accomplishing
his misappropriation. The following have been
noted as the more common methods of embezzling
money:
1. Defalcation by receiving cashiers in charge
of cash books (a) by making correct entries and
deposits but pocketing the proceeds of a cash
sale in outright theft; (b) withholding receipts
and failing to enter them in the cash book or
deposit slip; and (c) taking money to cover up
a shortage of a prior date and deferring entries
in cash book accordingly, thus working on the
"lag" (called "lapping").
2. Defalcation by a receiving-paying cashier
in charge of cash book and with access to other
records. Such a cashier-bookkeeper has a lim-
itless opportunity for peculation through
manipulations of records to cover his misap-
propriation both in posting actual accounts or
creating fictitious ones, such as misappropriat-
ing cash and charging the amount to fictitious
customers' accounts.
3. Using cheques in payment of accounts of
fictitious suppliers and cashing them through a
dummy (requiring collusion), or by forged or
faked endorsements. This type of fraud is com-
[Vol. 49
FRAUD CONTROL AND INVESTIGATION
mon where the cashier has check signing au-
thority or the proprietor in signing fails to
scrutinize the invoice.
4. Raising amounts of checks and supporting
invoices and vouchers after they have been
officially approved.
5. Issuing and cashing checks for returned
purchases that have not actually been returned.
6. Forging checks and destroying them when
returned by the bank and then concealing the
transactions by juggling the totals ("forcing
footings") in the cash books or by raising the
amounts of legitimate checks.
7. Double payment by issuing duplicate checks
for the same creditor's invoice and retaining the
second check.
8. Appropriating checks made payable to
"cash" or "bank" supposedly for creditors' ac-
counts, payment of notes, or other expenses.
9. "Kiting" checks by issuing a false check
on a distant bank and using the time lag and
another check to make good the first, and re-
peating the process.
10. Pocketing part of customers' payments and
offsetting them on the books by improper
credits for returned goods, allowances, and dis-
counts.
11. Invoicing goods below listed prices and tak-
ing a "kickback" from the purchaser.
12. Pocketing collections made on presumably
uncollectible accounts, aged accounts receiva-
ble, or accounts already written off as bad
debts.
13. Charging customers more than the dupli-
cate sales slips show and appropriating the
difference.
14. "Dipping" the cash register and tampering
with the tape to cover the misappropriation,
such as by ringing up $5.00 on a $10.00 cash
sale and pocketing the $5.00 difference.
15. Increasing the amounts of suppliers' in-
voices and pocketing the excess or splitting with
the creditors.
16. Failing to enter records of returned pur-
chases, allowances and discounts and retaining
equivalent amounts of cash.
17. Padding payrolls in the matter of rates of
pay, working time, production, numbers of em-
ployees, fictitious or dummy employees and the
like.
18. Pocketing unclaimed wages, dividends, and
refundables.
THE ACCOUNTANT AND T1fE POLICEMAN
The detection of business frauds and defalca-
tions was once considered to be almost the sole
function of the public accountant. In the account-
ing profession there has been a tendency to rele-
gate this function to the background because of
the widening scope of the accountants' activities,
particularly in the field of constructive needs of
business as business adviser, financial expert, and
the like. As a result too little attention has been
devoted to commercial irregularities, business
frauds, and financial defalcations. True the func-
tion has been-passed to some degree to the exter-
nal and internal auditor, but this does not fully
compensate for observance in the normal account-
ing procedures.
On the other hand there has been a tendency
for the police function to enter in only in the more
spectacular and obvious aspects of fraud-law en-
forcement. As a result, it seems an ever widening
gulf exists between the business audit function
and the law. enforcement function, where many
offences of public interest and liability go unde-
tected or, if detected, are covered up only to go
on spreading their vicious culture.
The dosing of this gulf is in the public interest
as well as to the mutual benefit of the accounting
and law enforcement professions. There should be
a drawing closer together in the common interest
and reciprocal exchange and utilization of tech-
niques and information-a developing of a com-
mon meeting ground and a greater spirit of
co-operation and understanding. In the field of
fraud the accountant is an investigator, and per-
force the investigator must needs become an ac-
countant. Their interest and functions are inex-
tricably interlocked in this vital phase of crime.
COUNTERACTING FRAUD
This in itself is a broad subject which does not
permit of full treatment in this paper. However,
certain of the more salient nieasures and devices
for the prevention and detection of fraud should
be considered in rounding out our theme:
(1) Interval Control. This is a scientific distribu-
tion of duties and responsibilities within a busi-
ness organization (division of labour) in order
to establish a system of checks and balances so
designed that the activity of one officer or em-
ployee will automatically, continuously and
with minimum of duplication check the work
of others and thus safeguard the assets and con-
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firm the accounting records. It is supplemented
by the internal and external audit.
(2) Personnel Management. Close attention
should be given to screening of personnel to
weed out unfavourable applicants and there-
after by personnel problem supervision and
satisfactory working conditions forestall the
human situations leading to fraud.
(3) Business Machines. Numerous devices are
.vailable as fraud deterrents including improved
cash registers; protectographs; check writers;
business forms systems; special cameras to
simultaneously photograph the check casher,
his check, and identification; safety paper for
checks and negotiable instruments; perforating
typewriters.
(4) Bonding, Guaranty, and Surely Companies.
Insurance provides both financial protection,
control guidance, and even detection service.
(5) Commercial Sources of Information. There
are a number of reliable and efficient organiza-
tions providing a service to business and the
public and a valuable source of information to
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(6) Public Education. This medium is of the
greatest value in controlling fraud. Public
awareness through every medium of publicity
helps to forewarn, forearm, and forestall. The
repetitious nature of swindles with similar modus
operandi-or just the same old pill with a sugar
coating-is remarkable. Constant education as
demonstrated in the RCMP Crime in Your
Community publications tnd a well advised
public are sometimes the only means to combat
the "artful dodger".
(7) Governmental Provisions. Much is being done
and remains to be done in the field of govern-
mental control of fraud by agressive legislation,
securities controls, commissions, combines in-
vestigation, labour legislation, and improved
social and working conditions.
AUDIT-INVESTIGATION
Having stressed the relationship that exists
between the auditor and the policeman in the
common objective of fraud detection let us con-
sider some audit techniques which can be of value
in police investigation:
1 Accounting Records. For our purposes these
include: (a) Books of account, comprising journal,
ledgers, or a corresponding ledger card system-
cash book, check records, minute book, stock
records, inventory records, financial statements,
and the like. In this category we should not
overlook "the little black book" as it is a human
foible for individuals, particularly bookkeepers,
to keep some record of their misappropriations;
(b) Commerical instruments, including all docu-
ments pertaining to a transaction from begin-
ning to end such as purchase orders, inspection
sheets, packing slips, weight slips, way bills,
bills of lading, manifests, invoices, statements
of account, debit and credit memos, deposit
slips, drafts or checks, bank statements, and re-
ceipts; (c) Files containing the correspondence
in negotiating the transactions; and (d) Bank
records and safety deposit box contents.
(2) Searches and Seizures. In searches and sei-
zures involving records the question invariably
arises in a policeman's mind what to take and
how much. Taking records may unnecessarily
disrupt a business, but by the same token this
concern encourages co-operation. Much depends
on the nature of the fraud, the identity of the
suspect, existing conditions, and overhanging
circumstances. If the scene of the crime is a
business and the suspect an employee and the
offence embezzlement, then management will
willingly place all records and facilities at your
disposal including the accountant. On the other
hand if a well established business itself is sus-
pect, as in a tax fraud, although too much co-
operation cannot be expected from manage-
ment, it is possible to conduct the examination
of records on the scene with relative security of
records and often with the benefit of explana-
tions from the accountant as the investigation
proceeds. In a case of a more flagrant crime in-
volving a dubious business organization such as
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smuggling, securities fraud, a swindle, or some
gross criminal racket the records should be
seized outright and secured. As to quantity and
when in doubt as to selection take the lot,
better to have too much than too little. Quan-
tity not only increases the probability of dis-
covering deliberate manipulations but also un-
conscious oversights on the part of the culprit.
The principles of security, continuity of posses-
sion, and marking for identification without
defacing or adding prejudicial notations are of
particular importance in audit investigations.
3. Organization of Records. Following even the
best organized search and seizure the account-
ing records are usually in a state of confusion.
They should be re-arranged in orderly fashion
at the outset-bringing order out of chaos-in
preparation for a systematic approach to the
audit-examination.
4. The Audit Program. A plan of attack should
be drawn up outlining the progressive steps to
be taken in attaining intermediate and final ob-
jectives and check-back verifications. This is
set up in logical form and followed closely. The
audit program is an essential part of the exami-
nation, acting as a guide in the welter of material
and confusion which characterizes the begin-
ning of an audit-investigation. It is of little avail
in the long run to be haphazard in the advance,
as not only can you get utterly lost in the maze
but salient objectives can be by-passed and re-
capitulation is impossible.
5. Examination of Records. This phase in the
light of the audit program takes two broad
forms: (a) The bringing together or "marrying
up" of related documents from both the files
and commercial instruments; and (b) Examina-
tion of records proper which entails following
up the questioned transactions, from previous
information or leads obtained from "marrying
up" pertinent documents, into the postings in
the books of account and tracing the ramifica-
tions through the accounting records to ulti-
mate disposition and noting discrepancies.
The process can be reversed, i.e. from records to
documents. The sins of omission as well as
commission, important in all criminal investiga-
tions, are of particular moment in the a,,dit-
investigation as very often an effort to cover up
the offence-by manipulation, alteration, ad-
justment, and human frailty of overlooking
minute details in "framing" a situation-usually
results in more damning evidence than laid
down in committing the offence itself. This is
one field of investigation where the old maxim
of "be sure your sins will find you out" is most
appropriate. Even when the audit is non-pro-
ductive in a material sense the very process,
inevitable queries and disturbing effects prove
of great psychological value in later interroga-
tion of the suspect.
6. Working Papers. As the examination of rec-
ords progresses according to the audit program,
notes, listings, breakdowns, and running rec-
ords should be kept in organized fashion of the
material studied for later reference in compiling
reports and referring back to the original docu-
ments and accounting entries. A system of
cross-reference numbering is followed through-
out. These records are commonly called work-
ing papers and again are an essential to an
orderly attack on the mass of material involved.
7. Schedules of Analysis. An analysis of special
features of the investigation can be better pre-
sented in schedule fashion rather than by the
composition method. This lends itself to colum-
nar treatment and aids both the investigator
and the reader in wading through the intricacies
of an analytical study or comparison without
losing himself.
8. Charts. A compilation of detailed information
or explanation of a complex transaction or
inter-related transactions can best be presented
in charts, providing a clear, organized, and con-
densed presentation of involved details. Chart
presentation takes two main forms: (a) Verbal,
either in columnar or flow chart fashion, as
commonly used in complicated conspiracy
cases; and (b) Graphical, by use of line, bar, or
other forms of graphs which not only provide
a pictorial presentation of information but also
a means of analyzing the information.
9. Photographic Aids. Photographing or photo-
stating pertinent documents and manipulation
or alteration of records provides a permanent
record and also simpler and dearer means of
presentation than trying to describe the details
in words.
10. The Audit-Investigation Report. The cover-
ing report should take the form of an overall
coordinating brief or summary, referring for de-
tails to accompanying schedules of analysis,
charts, and photostats of evidential documents
and records and merely pointing-up significant
conclusions. Where a great mass of material is
involved it should be organized, indexed, and
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bound in book style for ready reference and easy
study.
DETECTION OF FRAUD
The auditor's methods of examination can be of
considerable assistance to the police investigator.
The following outline provides some common ap-
proaches to the detection of fraud in accounting
records by audit-investigation which may be use-
ful as a guide to the policeman:
Irregularities re cancelled checks.
1. Examine endorsements and compare with
name of payee.
2. Investigate checks made out to shareholders
and employees or endorsed by an officer or share-
holder.
3. Watch for variations in endorsements-sec-
ond or even third endorsements.
4. Watch for initials on face of check-this
might indicate that a person other than the payee
cashed the check and the second endorsement was
waived.
5. Examine face and reverse side of checks for
erasures and alterations.
6. It is not uncommon for the teller to note on
the back of a check the denomination of the bills
handed out. If a number of one hundred dollar
bills ($100.) have been listed the payee's records
should be examined to see if the income has been
recorded.
7. Absence of clearing stamp indicates that
check was negotiated at the branch on which the
check was drawn.
8. Note the place where check was negotiated.
9. Where it is normal for checks to be typed or
written by a check writer, handwritten checks
should be investigated.
10. Investigate checks made out either to cash
or a bank, particularly large payments.
11. When checks are held for a considerable
time before being cashed or deposited, investigate
if the income has been reported.
12. Investigate any variation from the normal
routine.
13. Keep in mind, when examining checks, that
your examination may lead to the discovery of
income suppression of the payee as well as the
payer.
14. Checks made out to cash for wages, etc.,
should be test-checked to the payroll records.
15. Check for duplicate checks made out to
same account payable.
Deposits
1. Examine the duplicate deposit slips.
2. Cross check check listings to the cash book,
including name of payee, if possible.
3. Cross check cash deposits to the cash book.
4. Determine whether cash deposited is in line
with size and type of business.
5. Investigate any checks or cash deposits not
posted to the cash book.
6. Scrutinize bank statements. Investigate any
erasures or alterations.
7. Test check additions.
8. Examine any large deposits.
9. Test check deposit slips to the bank state-
ment or pass book.
Drafts
1. Examine draft register.
2. Determine method of recording receipts.
3. Test check draft register to accounts receiva-
ble.
Signing Authorities
1. Peruse copy of company's contract with bank.
2. Get copy of bank authorizations re signing
authorizations as shown by the Minute Book.
Loans
1. Investigate any loans to a company made
by a shareholder.
2. Investigate subscriptions to stock of com-
pany by a shareholder.
3. Investigate the amounts credited by com-
pany to a shareholder or proprietor.
4. Check authenticity of all loans.
5. Enquire into collateral put up for loans made
by banks to company.
Sales
1. Check bills of lading to Sales and/or Accounts
Receivable to see that shipments are accounted
for.
2. Check delivery slips to Sales and/or Accounts
Receivable to see that deliveries are accounted for.
3. Is Gross Profit percentage in line for the type
of business?
4. If sales are to non-residents, test check with
Customs Export Entry (B13), or Trade and Com-
merce Export Permit.
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5. Test check sales slips, tapes, invoices, etc., to
receipts.
6. If there is a numerical sequence in sales in-
voices, test check sequence.
7. If suspicious, test check additions-sales may
be understated.
8. Check authenticity of credit notes, if neces-
sary verifying with debtor.
9. Are lines of merchandise handled in short
supply and therefore commanding a premium?
10. Review sales account in the last month of
the fiscal year.
I1. Test check factory work orders to sales.
12. Test check credit notes entered in last
month of year. Check to third party records if
necessary.
Accounts Receivable
1. Check authenticity of all write offs.
2. Check authenticity of all accounts and bal-
ances by means of a mailed statement.
Suldry Revenue
Check to see that receipts other than from the
main source are accounted for:
1. Special discounts and rebates




5. Sales tax refunds
6. Scrap sales
7. Sales of by-products
8. Proceeds from fire or damage claims.
Purchases
1. Check authenticity of purchase invoices, in-
cluding major purchases of capital assets, if neces-
sary verifying with creditor. Verify with covering
check.
2. Watch for duplicate copy of purchase invoices
put through later and payment applied against
personal account of shareholder.
3. If suspicious, test check additions-purchases
ma- be over-stated.
4. Examine purchases for the last month of the
fiscal year.
Accounts Payable
1. Check for fictitious liabilities, creditors, to
which checks may be drawn.
Payroll
1. Checks made out to cash for wages, etc.,
should be checked to subsidiary payroll record to
see that all monies were paid out to employees.
Inventory
1. Inventory understatement is not necessarily
fraud but is indicative.
2. Where a cashier pockets proceeds of cash
sales and there are no sales slips used, the misap-
propriation can usually only be disclosed by a
careful inventory check or stock-taking because
an inventory adjustment would have to be made
for the goods sold and not accounted for.
General Journal Entries
1. Scrutinize all general entries.
General
1. Peruse minute book, looking for unusual au-
thority to officers.
2. Examine insurance policies.
3. Pay particular heed to businesses where chief
shareholder(s) has proprietorship or partnership
as well, one operating complementary to the
other.
4. One cannot divorce fraud on a large scale
from income tax evasion.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Canada is progressing economically from the
primary to the secondary stage of production.
From a country of basic or extractive operations
we are becoming a major industrial and commer-
cial nation. This century is for Canada what the
last century was for the U.S.A. From the law-
enforcement point of view such a change naturally
increases offences of a commercial nature, with
crime in business and business in crime. These
conditions are accentuated and aggravated by the
rapid transition and unprecedented expansion
which have characterized our economic evolution,
stimulated by the impetus of the Second World
War and the momentum of post-war development.
We can anticipate a greater demand for investi-
gations of a complex nature concerning business
organization and financial matters. It is reiterated
that not only can we expect a growing incidence
of crime involving ordinary businesses but also
crime itself being organized and functioning on
syndicate or big business lines. Law enforcement
J. G. E. MURRA Y
is also becoming more closely integrated with
governmental institutions responsible for the regu-
lation of commercial activities. Finally, we may
become increasingly concerned with borderline
crime or irregularities in both government and
business-so called white collar crime-presenting
something of a new field of investigation.
All these facets of an expanding law-enforce-
ment function reflect significant fraud ramifica-
tions which render themselves to special treatment
and the techniques of audit-investigation. In keep-
ing pace with the economic growth of our country
the Canadian policeman should be prepared and
equipped to cope with the trend of the times and
to better perform his function in the field of com-
mercial investigation. For the policeman the ac-
counting book is taking the place of the brand
book.
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